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Comment
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART'S PHILOSOPHY
OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
James A. Gazell*
This Comment examines AssociateJusticePotterStewart'sphilosophy offederal
judicialadministrationas refected by his particpationin numerous decisions as a
Justice of the UnitedStates Supreme Courtfornearly twenty-threeyears. The centraltheme ofthis Comment is that Justice Stewart consistently sought to improve the
operationsof thefederaljudiciary-flrst,by imposition ofstringentlimitationson the
kinds of litigationpermittedto enter this system and second,by structural,manageria, andproceduralmodpfcations to expedite the dispositionof those cases allowed
into the FederalCourts.
This Comment discussesrulingsin the areaoffederaljudicialadministrationduring Justice Stewart s tenure, with a view to explicating his eforts to help regulate
litgationalaccessto thefederalcourts,andhis attemptsto help acceleratetheflow of
cases through such tribunals. It concludes by noting Justice Stewart's interest in
limitingaccess, so that the sytem as a whole is not imperiled

INTRODUCTION

Today it is the shamefulfact that in many of the large cities of
the United States thefederal district courts are three and sometimes four years behind in their work We can accept without
elaborationthe truism thatjustice delayedisjustice denied W/hat
it is importantto realize is that it is the massive number of diversity of citizenship cases that both beget and are begotten by this
delay.1

This excerpt comes from an address delivered in 1957 to the

Ohio Bar Association by Potter Stewart, then a member of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and later an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States for

nearly twenty-three years. His comment is significant in at least
two respects. First, it represents his first public manifestation of
* Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies, San Diego State University. B.A., Roosevelt University (1963); M.A., Roosevelt University (1966); Ph.D., Southern Illinois University (1968).
1. Stewart, The Role of the FederalCourts in the Administration of Justice, 30 OHIO
BAR 475, 479 (1957).
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interest in judicial administration (especially at the federal level),

a subject which has become salient as the quantity and complexity
of litigation have risen in the federal and state court systems over

the last few decades.2 Second, his observation came early in his
judicial career-he had been a judge for only three years-and
marks the start of his persistent interest in this area later exemplified in his judicial decisions.
With Justice Stewart's retirement on July 3, 1981, an assessment of his record in the field of federal judicial administration is
both timely and appropriate; it has yet to receive scholarly

attention.
Other analysts have focused their efforts on the judicial rather
than administrative facets of Justice Stewart's work, particularly
his decisions concerning freedom of speech and racial equality,
and on the validity of his widespread reputation as a "swing" or
"moderate" member of the Supreme Court. The popular press
invariably recalls his propensity for occasional memorable phrase-

ology, as illustrated by his brief attempt at a definition of pornography in Jacobellis v. Ohio.'
Other aspects of the Justice's juridical persona which have attracted attention include his dissent from banning prayers in pub-

lic schools,' his opposition to the judicial nullification of state
birth control laws,6 his sympathy towards civil rights,7 his inclina2. See L. DOWNIE, JUSTICE DENIED 30, 50, 68 (1971); R. WHEELER & H. WHITCOMB, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 16-17 (1977); Berkson, Delay and Congestion in State
Court Systems: An Overview, in MANAGING THE STATE COURTS 204, 209-10 (L. Berkson,
S. Hayes & S. Carbon eds. 1977).
3. See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED 12-14, 57 (1974); H.
SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING 90-92, 135-36 (1979); Binion, Justice Stewart

on RacialEquality. What It Means to Be a Moderate,6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 853 (1979);
Lewis, Justice Stewart and Fourth Amendment Probable Cause: "Swing Voter" or Participants in a "New Majoriy," 22 Loy. L. REV. 713 (1976); Greenhouse, Stewart.'A Lawyer Not
a Philosopher, N.Y. Times June 19, 1981, § A at 14, col. 4; Zimmerman, U.S. Supreme
CourtLosing Moderate, Yet UnpredictableJustice, Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 19, 1981, §
A, at 1, col. 1; Some Legal Minds Share Their Opinionsofthe Justices, New Orleans TimesPicayune, July 30, 1978, § 3, at 8, col. 3.
4. 378 U.S. 184 (1964):
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved
in this case is not that.
Id. at 197.
5. See Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
6. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
7. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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tion to uphold social and economic legislation," his ambivalence
toward the application (but not the constitutionality) of the death
penalty,9 his concern for property rights,' ° and his support for a
qualified right of abortion" (but not for the public funding of
abortion).' 2 Although the press noticed' 3 Justice Stewart's willingness to discuss, in general terms, the inner workings of the
Supreme Court, 14 no other facets of his federal judicial administration concerns have received either popular or scholarly

exploration.
This Comment seeks to fill an important gap in the literature

by examining Justice Stewart's outlook on federal judicial administration, which becomes apparent through analysis of pertinent
Supreme Court decisions. Improvement in the operation of the
federal judiciary, according to Justice Stewart, would come first
by imposing stringent limitations on the kinds of litigation permitted to enter the system. Second, Justice Stewart supported structural, managerial, and procedural steps to expedite the disposition
of those cases allowed into the federal courts. He viewed both
approaches as complementary methods of increasing the likelihood that federal tribunals might settle civil and criminal matters
more expeditiously and fairly.

These observations suggest the three subdivisions of this Comment: (1) a note on the ambit of judicial administration and
Potter Stewart's place within it;' 5 (2) the Justice's efforts to regulate litigational access to the federal courts;' 6 and (3) his17attempts
to accelerate the flow of cases through such regulation.

I.

THE AMBIT OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

State and federal judicial administration studies focus on
resolving criminal and civil disputes with honesty, competence,
8. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
9. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (Stewart, J. concurring).
10. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
11. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
12. See Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
13. See Justice Stewart Steps Down, Wash. Post, June 19, 1981, § A, at 14, col. 1.
14. See, e.g., Stewart, The Nine of Us: 'Guardians of the Constitution,' 41 FLA. BJ.
1090 (1967); Stewart, 4ddress at Mid-Winter Meeting of New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 18
N.H.B.J. 159 (1977); Stewart, Inside the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1979, § A at
17, col.
15.
16.
17.

2.
See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28-125 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 126-62 and accompanying text.
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evenhandedness, individualization, and fairness-that is, with justice. 18 The pursuit of these overlapping and sometimes conflicting
ideals embroils judges in diverse problem areas.
One such area is structural innovations-chiefly court unification. This category includes: creation of a central judicial policymaking organization (such as a judicial conference or council);
establishment of court administration offices; authority of the
highest judicial body to make rules for the entire court system; the
assignment of judges to areas of heaviest workloads; a single
budget for the whole court system; a judicial personnel system independent from civil service; a single set of trial courts with comprehen.sive, exclusive, original jurisdiction; and the abolition of all
judicial fee offices. 19
A second category is that of managerial facets, which embrace
the administration of such disparate but overlapping functions as
court calendars, finances, facilities, equipment, juries, witnesses,
personnel, planning, public relations, record-keeping, report writing, coordination, and data processing. Court administrators perform or supervise these tasks in accordance with directions set by
a central judicial policymaking agency or a chief judicial executive, such as a chief justice.2 0
A third classification focuses on a melange of procedural matters, including administrative rule-making, assignment practices
affecting judges, courtroom security measures, plea bargaining
policies, proper jury size, nonunanimous verdicts in criminal
cases, habeas corpus practices, standing, political questions, abstention, diversity jurisdiction, class actions, public compensation
for participation in governmental proceedings, and judicially inferred causes of actions. Rules governing these subjects affect not
only the flow of litigation but also the extent to which disputes
may enter such systems."
Justice Stewart's view on the structural, managerial, and procedural issues of judicial administration include three notable attributes. First, his concerns largely center on the federal courts,
although he did participate in Supreme Court decisions with di18. Gazell, The PrincoalFacets and Goals of Court Management:A Sketch, in MANAGING THE STATE COURTS, supra note 2, at 24, 24.

19. Id. at 25-27.
20. D. SAAU, MODERN COURT MANAGEMENT: TRENDS IN THE ROLE OF THE COURT
EXECUTIVE 4-10 (1970); Gazell, supra note 18, at 29-34.
21. See W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 21-22 (1964); J.
SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT 103-50 (1960); Berkson, supra note 2, at 210-13;
Gazell, supra note 18, at 25, 27-28.
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rect impact on state court management. Among these were decisions regarding the extension of the right to counsel to all criminal
cases where incarceration is a possibility,2 2 the use of municipal
court clerks to perform the normally judicial function of issuing
arrest warrants,23 and the limitations on the authority of mayorjudges whose villages possess a vested financial interest in the outcome of traffic cases.24 Stewart dissented from the majority's approval of nonlawyer judges in criminal cases where the right to a
retrial on appeal existed.2
Second, Justice Stewart's interest in court administration has
been a long and sustained one, dating publicly from 1954. At age
thirty-nine he became the youngest circuit court of appeals judge
in the country. 26 Subsequently, his work in the area occurred
through both the Court Administration Committee of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, and the Judicial Administration
Section of the American Bar Association.27
Third, evidence of Stewart's philosophy toward federal judicial administration lies not so much in his speeches or extra-judicial activities but in a potpourri of Supreme Court decisions issued
over twenty-three years. These holdings illuminate his views toward the two salient issues of access to federal courts and acceleration of the caseflow.
II.

JUDICIAL ACCESS IN CRIMINAL CASES

Justice Stewart displayed his philosophy toward federal judicial administration through decisions which generally restricted
the access of plaintiffs to the national courts. His implicit perspective was that an expanding case load could not be resolved expeditiously and fairly merely by structural, managerial, and
procedural alterations. Rather, criminal and civil input into the
system would also have to be limited.
One such limitation, which Justice Stewart favored particularly, was the exclusion of "victimless crime" cases from the national courts, not only to lower the workloads of such tribunals,
22. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
23. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
24. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
25. See North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
26. Zimmerman, Unpredictable Stewart-the Voice of Moderation, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, June 19, 1981, § A, at 9, coL 1; PresidentNames 11for Judgeshis, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 7, 1954, at 28, col. 3; Justice Stewart, The Docket Sheet, Oct.-Nov. 1981, at 3.
27. Address by Associate Justice Stewart, Judicial Administration Section, American
Bar Association (Aug. 24, 1959), at 2.
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but also to limit the reach of governmental authority into what he
regarded as private conduct. The ambit of victimless crimes would
include a variety of historically proscribed conduct, such as abortion, bribery, drug addiction, espionage, family disputes, euthanasia, fornication, gambling, homosexuality, loitering, marijuana
use, mental disorder, narcotics consumption, obscenity, pornography for adults, private quarrels, prostitution, public drunkeness,
suicide, Sunday closing laws, and venereal diseases.28 In recent
years, governmental institutions have begun to react in three complementary ways toward such conduct: legalization, as in the example of abortion; a reduction in criminal penalties, as in the case
of marijuana possession and use; and the adoption of a therapeutic rather than punitive approach, as in the construction of detoxification and methadone distribution centers.
Although Justice Stewart eschewed wholesale de-criminalitzation of hitherto criminal conduct, he cautiously disapproved of
criminal status in at least four areas: pornography for adults, narcotics addiction, .public drunkenness, and abortion. His implied
distaste for proscription of pornography for adults stemmed from
his career-long adherence to a broad view of free speech.29 Similar
views on narcotics addiction were expressed in a 1962 Supreme
Court decision3" which invalidated a California law making narcotics addiction a crime punishable by a mandatory jail term of at
least three months. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart,
held that the legislation violated the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment" by punishing persons for
their condition or status per se and not for any antisocial behavior.3 2 The same was true of public drunkenness; in 1968 Justice
Stewart joined Justice Fortas in dissenting from a decision upholding the conviction of a defendant for public drunkenness even
though he was an alcoholic.33
His endorsement of noncriminal status for abortion originated
in his 1973 concurrence to one of the Court's most controversial
28. See N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME
CONTROL 3 (1970); R. RICH, THE SOCIOLOGY OF CRIMINAL LAW, Table of Contents
(1979); E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS 169-79 (1965); Morris, The Law is a Busy-

body, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 10.
29. See Greenhouse, supra note 3, § A, at 14, col. 5; Stewart, The Role and Rights of
the Press, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1974, § A, at 20, col. 3.
30. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67.

33. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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thrusts into the domain of victimless crimes: the overturning of
most state anti-abortion statutes.3 4 The right to abortion, he
wrote, was clearly "embraced within the personal liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. '3 He
reaffirmed this position at a press conference following the announcement of his imminent retirement from the bench.3 6 His
concurrence was surprising because he had dissented from a high
court ruling.in 196537 that invalidated a Connecticut ban on con-

traceptives. He favored the repeal of this statute, but did not believe that the Court should substitute its view for that of the state
legislature.3 8 In 1972, however, he joined the majority in nullifyig a Massachusetts statute which permitted only married persons
access to contraceptives. The statute was held to be violative of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 9
Other victimless crimes also were matters of concern to Justice
Stewart. He saw Sunday closing laws as an unwarranted governmental intrusion into the practice of faiths, like Orthodox Judaism, which require abstention from work on Saturday, but not on
Sunday. In a 1961 dissent from a group of Supreme Court rulings
in this area, he commented:
Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an Orthdox Jew
to choose between his religious faith and his economic survival.
That is a cruel choice. It is a choice which I think no State can
constitutionally demand. For me this is not something that can
be swept under the rug and forgotten in the interest of enforced
Sunday togetherness.'
Sexual conduct between consenting adults is an issue where
Justice Stewart's views are less clear. In 1975, for instance, he
joined the majority in summarily affarming a lower court decision
upholding a Virginia enactment outlawing homosexual acts and
heterosexual oral copulation. 4 ' This position, along with his votes
34. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 170.
36. See Dear Mr. Steward [sic, Why Do You Stay on fithel Court Longer than You
Need toZ Wash. Post, June 20, 1981, § A, at 9, col. 3.
37. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 530-31.
39. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
40. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermarket, 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Sunday-closing statute upheld after challenges on free exercise, due process, and equal

protection grounds).
41. See Doe v. Richmond, 425 U.S. 901, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976). See R.
WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 425 (1979).
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on contraceptive issues, conflicts with his support of abortion
rights-for all three subjects are matters of privacy deserving uniform treatment. These decisions enhance his reputation as a
"swing" justice.
III.

JUDICIAL ACCESS IN CIVIL CASES

Although the Justice may have considered some victimless
crime cases as sand in the federal judicial gears, he saw greater
opportunities for limiting judicial access in civil litigation. He
participated in numerous decisions affecting the intake of litigation into the civil system, covering numerous subjects: diversityof-citizenship jurisdiction, political questions, habeas corpus
filings, abstention, standing, class actions, public recompense for
participation in governmental proceedings, and implied causes of
action.
A. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction
Although diversity of citizenship cases 42 were not the first access decisions faced by Justice Stewart, they represent his earliest
known interest. As early as 1957, two years before becoming a
Supreme Court member, he manifested a strong concern with this
topic when he called on "the lawyers of the United States to take a
long and careful look at the whole concept of diversity jurisdiction."43 He expressed strong skepticism toward the continuation
of diversity jurisdiction."
Justice Stewart's doubts about the validity and necessity of diversity jurisdiction in light the rising caseloads in federal tribunals
stemmed from four implicit observations: the incongruity of having national and state judges with different salaries, juries, and
procedures applying the same state law; the desirability of having
judicial forum decided by the significance of the litigation rather
than by accidents of geography; a suspicion that federal courts
were flooded with trivial suits; and a confidence in the ability of
state courts to handle state questions expeditiously and fairly, especially toward non-resident parties.4 5 He furnished no support,
however, for his disenchantment with the federal disposition of
such cases and his concomitant faith in state judiciaries.
42. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
43. Stewart, supra note 1, at 480.
44. See id. at 481-82. Stewart did stop short of urging Congress to eliminate such
authority.
45. Stewart, supra note 1, at 480.
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In 1976 Stewart reaffirmed his misgivings toward diversity litigation by dissenting from a Supreme Court holding that barred a
federal trial judge from remanding a case to a state court because
a crowded district court calendar allegedly hampered the plaintiffs' efforts to have their case decided on its merits. The dissenting justices argued that the majority ruling violated what they
regarded as express congressional intent to allow such transfers.4 6
In 1978 Justice Stewart spoke for the majority in mandating
total diversity of citizenship as a prerequisite to the invocation of
federal judicial authority.4 7 He explained that "diversity jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different
State from each plaintiff."' 48 In his view, historical congressional
intent dictated this conclusion.4 9
Stewart's opposition to diversity litigation in the federal judicial system also reflected his concern about the size and steady rise
in the number of diversity cases confronting federal district courts
during the late 1970's and about Congress' reluctance to eliminate
diversity jurisdiction. Between 1975 and 1980, such diversity
cases constituted between twenty and twenty-five percent of the
total caseload.50 Congress is reluctant to eliminate diversity jurisdiction because of opposition from the organized bar which favors
the latitude permitted by such jurisdiction. Indeed, access to the
courts was recently made easier, at least in federal question cases,
by eliminating the requirement that the amount in controversy in
such cases be at least $10,000.51
B. PoliticalQuestions
Justice Stewart also sought to curtail litigational access to the
national bench in cases involving political questions. Courts have
traditionally considered these issues nonjusticiable and thus better
left to legislative or executive resolution. Justice Stewart first analyzed this subject in a spate of legislative redistricting suits in the
1960's and 1970's. Initially, he wanted to narrow the scope of review for such cases, although one effect was the opening of federal
46.
47.
48.
49.

Thermtron Products Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 361 (1976).
See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
Id. at 373 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 374.

50. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES COURTS 227 (Table 17) (1980) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
51. Jurisdictional Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980). See
Josephson, Access to Justice.A Legislative Analysis, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 810 (1980).
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judicial gates to more of them. In 1962, for instance, he voted
with the majority to mandate the reapportionment of one house of
bicameral state legislatures through uniformly populated districts
in accordance with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 2 A year later he concurred in a decision applying
this requirement to a Georgia county-unit system for tabulating
votes in the primary elections for United States Senator and for
statewide offices-a method which resulted in giving greater
weight to votes from small towns rather than urban sections of this
state. 53 His concurrence concluded: "Within a given constituency,
there can be room for but a single constitutional rule-one voter,
54
one vote."
In 1964, however, Justice Stewart dissented from two reappor56
tionment decisions, Wesberry v. Sanders5 5 andReynolds v. Sims,
which triggered an avalanche of litigation in the federal district
courts. 7 Wesberry had upheld reapportionment in U.S. House of
Representatives districts. Justice Stewart's dissent rested on the
belief that, despite the justiciability of the redistricting issue, the
Constitution did not require such reapportionment on a one-person, one-vote basis.5 s Reynolds had upheld reapportionment for
state legislatures. Justice Stewart dissented there from what he
saw as the Court's attempt to lock a particular (egalitarian) interpretation of proper legislative districting into the Constitution. In
another instance, Justice Stewart sought to permit alternative representational methods (for instance, geographical) in one legislative house to accommodate the regional, economic, and social
interests that vary from one state to another, thus encouraging the
development of different representational patterns.5 9 He summarized his outlook by saying:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause demands but two basic attributes of any plan of state legislative apportionment. First, it demands that, in the light of the State's own characteristics and
needs, the plan must be a rational one. Secondly, it demands
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 382.
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).

57. EDWARD S. CORWIN'S THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 522 (H.
Chase & C. Ducat eds. 1978). One need only "Shepardize" the Baker, Wesberry, and
Reynolds cases to perceive their extensive impact on the federal trial courts.
58. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 50-51 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
59. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 748-49 (1964)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
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that the plan must be such as not to permit the systematic frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate of the State
... . But, beyond this, I think there is nothing in the Federal
Constitution to prevent a State from choosing any electoral legislative structure it thinks 60best suited to the interests, temper,
and customs of its people.
Justice Stewart has sought further limitations on the egalitarian reapportionment concept. He supported a 1967 decision
which opposed the application of this concept to county school
boards 6 1 and he dissented in 1968 from a judicial extension of this
precept to Texas commissioner courts (local units with wide governmental authority). 62 He noted caustically "that the apportionment of the legislative body of a sovereign State, no less than the
apportionment of a county government, is far too subtle and complicated a business to be resolved as a matter of constitutional law
in terms of sixth-grade arithmetic." 63 In 196964 and 1973,65 he
voted to uphold deviations from mathematical equality in the
populations of state legislative districts, although he was less tolerant of such variances in judicially as opposed to legislatively ordered reapportionment plans. 6
C. Habeas Corpus Filings
Stewart also sought to restrict access to federal tribunals by
consistently discouraging habeas corpus filings. He first confronted this issue in 1963, when he dissented from two high court
rulings which greatly expanded the opportunity of prisoners to
challenge convictions by state courts.
In Townsend v. Sain,67 the Court directed federal trial bourts to
grant evidentiary hearings in cases where: a district judge's basis
for admitting a confession was indeterminable; the judge's reason
for instructing jurors to disregard a confession was unclear; the
60. Id. at 753-54. For Justice Stewart's dissents in cases analogous to Lucas, see
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 655 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 676-77 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1964);
Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 712 (1964).
61. See Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
62. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
63. Id. at 510.
64. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (Harlan, J.,joined by Stewart, J.,

dissenting).
65. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315

(1973).
dissenting); Connor v.
66. See McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981) (Stewart, J.,
Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
67. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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state court proceedings remained questionable; and past requests
for habeas corpus have been denied without evidentiary hearings.6 8 Justice Stewart encapsulated his displeasure with this decision in the following comment:
I differ with the Court's disposition of this case in two important respects. First, I strongly doubt the wisdom of using
this case--or any other-as a vehicle for cataloguing in advance a set of standards which are inflexibly to compel district
judges to grant evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus proceedings. Secondly, I think that a de novo evidentiary hearing is not
the very standards
required in the present case even under
69
which the Court's opinion elaborates.
In Fay v. Noia,7 ° the Court ordered the district courts to
furnish habeas corpus relief if a state prisoner convicted of murder
and sentenced to lifetime incarceration failed to waive intelligently and knowingly his right to appeal his conviction where the
appeal, if successful, would have resulted in a retrial and the
chance of capital punishment. He joined Justices Harlan and
Clark in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion, which favored a denial of relief on federalism grounds. The dissent saw this conviction as resting on a sufficient, independent state ground and
requiring federal judicial respect.7" Justice Clark, in a separate
dissent, noted that the majority's holding would precipitate a massive increase in the number of such petitions in the federal trial
courts.72 The incidence of such state petitions indeed mushroomed
3
from 2,624 in 1963 to 19,574 in 1980-a rise of 745.96%.1
Justice Stewart was sensitive to these concerns, and his desire
to reduce the stream of habeas corpus petitions continued through
the 1970's, when he increasingly found himself to be part of a new
majority. In Davis v. United States,7 4 he joined the Court in ruling that the exclusion of blacks from an indicting United States
grand jury was not, under the circumstances, grounds for granting
federal habeas corpus relief. His majority opinion in Frances v.
Henderson7 5 reaffirmed the Davis decision and also extended it to
the state court level, requiring a demonstration of actual prejudice
in the composition of state grand juries. The holding rested on
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 320-21.
Id. at 326 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Id. at 448-49.
Id. at 446.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 231 (Table 20).

74. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).

75. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
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"considerations of comity and federalism." 7 6 In another instance
he joined Justice Powell's concurrence in the Court's denial of
habeas corpus to a convict who had stood trial in prison attire,
and had failed to make a timely objection.7 7 In a third case, he
endorsed the majority's decision to bar relief to a state prisoner
who alleged that evidence introduced at his trial had been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment's ban on illegal
searches and seizures.7" The only caveat to this ruling was the
requirement that state tribunals supply a complete and fair opportunity for hearing evidentiary challenges.7 9
D. Abstention
Justice Stewart sought to limit access to the federal courts
through abstention. Stewart believed national tribunals, except in
extraordinary circumstances, should permit state proceedings to
conclude before considering whether to intercede in defense of
federal constitutional rights asserted by defendants in criminal
cases.80 This practice maintains federalism in the judicial sphere
and keeps most cases in state, rather than federal, courts. Such
deference, however, may thrust defendants into lengthy, costly litigation in state courts that may be hostile to claims of federal constitutional and statutory rights.
Initially, Justice Stewart opposed the abstention doctrine. In
1964 and 1965, he supported his colleagues' rulings to ease the
abstention policy where plaintiffs had made a reasonable mistake
in thinking that they had to file their actions in state tribunals
first 8 ' and where defendants had tried to stop prosecutions for alleged violations of state antisubversion statutes.8 2
Later, Justice Stewart adopted a more favorable view of abstention perhaps because of growing federal caseload pressures.
In 1970, a unanimous Court overturned the intervention of a
federal district court in a case involving the constitutionality of
Alaska fishing regulations which limited the issuance of salmon
gear licenses to a specific class of persons.8 3 The Court held that
76. Id. at 541.
77. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
78. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
79. Id. at 494.
80. For a discussion of the abstention doctrine, see C. WRiGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (3d ed. 1976).
81. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
82. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
83. Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
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to hear the suit while it was
the lower court should have declined
4
pending in an Alaska tribunal.1
In 1971, Justice Stewart supported several holdings which
raised the abstention barrier to various kinds of litigation. He
concurred in the Court's return to its earlier reluctance to intervene in matters involving alleged harassment and prosecution
under an evidently unconstitutional state law." He felt that threat
of irreparable injury to the defendants was not great and immediate enough to warrant federal judicial intervention. Such a danger might exist under other circumstances-for instance, where a
state law was prima facie unconstitutional or where "official lawlessness" in the administration of a state enactment had occurred. 6 He also applied the abstention doctrine to dissolve a
lower federal ourt injunction against prosecution under allegedly
unconstitutional state and local laws where no party had suffered
or been threatened with injury.8 7 Justice Stewart believed this
policy allowed state court prosecutions under state criminal anarchy laws to proceed without a prior determination of the constitutionality of such statutes.8 8 He supported this forebearance in a
trio of cases involving state prosecutions under obscenity laws, the
validity of which remained undecided. 9 Finally, he supported
abstention in a case involving a political party's challenge to the
constitutionality of a state loyalty oath.9"
E. Standing
Restriction on the grant of standing 9 was another theory by
which Justice Stewart sought to restrict entry into the national judiciary. Ultimately, he favored standing only for those plaintiffs
with direct, adversarial interests in the proceedings. As with abstention, he initially wanted to increase the scope of standing, but
later sought a narrowed application. This may have reflected his
growing alarm with the rise of the civil caseloads in the district
courts, which grew from 59,284 in 1960 to 87,321 in 1970 (an increase of 47.3%) and then catapulted to 168,789 by 1980 (a 93.3%
84. Id. at 87.
85. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
86. See id. at 56.
87. See Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
88. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
89. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); Dyson v. Stein,
401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
90. See Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583 (1972).
91. For a general discussion of standing, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 80, § 13.
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escalation during the 1970's).92 This change occurred despite two
partially countervailing developments-the recent decline in the
volume of federal criminal cases93 and the enactment of the Omnibus Judgeship Bill in 1978, which added 117 new federal trial
judge positions to the 398 previously authorized. 94
Justice Stewart's record on standing issues spans a thirteen
year period, beginning with his support of the 1968 decision to
grant federal taxpayers standing to file suit to stop the spending of
95
federal money for instructional materials in parochial schools.
In 1972, however, Stewart's majority opinion refused standing to
an environmental interest group which sought to enjoin federal
officials from permitting the building of a recreation area in a national park.96 This organization failed to allege harm to itself or
its members by the proposed construction. 97 Nonetheless, in 1974
Stewart dissented from a Court ruling that denied standing to a
taxpayer who sought to compel the Secretary of the Treasury to
disclose the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency pursuant to a constitutional provision requiring the disclosure of "all
public money" expended by the national government. 98 Stewart
asserted: "It seems to me that when the asserted duty is, as here,
as particularized, palpable, and explicit as those which courts regularly recognize in private contexts, it should make no difference
that the obligor is the Government and the duty is embodied in
our organic law."99 Later in his opinon he added that, although
the taxpayer's case might well be dismissed on one or more of
several bases, that did not mean that the taxpayer did not have
standing to bring the case.' 0
The following year, Justice Stewart reversed his field. He
joined the majority in disallowing standing to petitioners who
challenged the constitutionality of restrictive zoning ordinances
which allegedly prevented persons of low and middle incomes
The Court's
from living in a suburb of Rochester, New York.'
92. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 217 (Table 13).
93. Id. at 269 (Table 40).
94. See Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 1(c), 92 Stat. 1629, 1630; Carter
Signs B1I/Adding Judges, San Diego Union, Oct. 21, 1978, § A, at 2, col. 3.
95. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
96. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
97. Id. at 735.
98. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 202 (1974). The relevant constitutional

7.
provision is found at U.S. CONsT. art. 1,§ 9, cl.
99. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 204.
100. Id. at 207.
101. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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denial was due to an absence of a direct relationship between the
alleged harm and the ordinances. The Court saw the plaintiffs
willingness
ability to live in this community as dependent on10 the
2
of third parties to construct low income housing.
In 1976, Justice Stewart supported the Court's denial of standing to citizens seeking to revise the disciplinary procedures of a
police department because the plaintiffs had alleged no personal
deprivations of constitutional rights. 0 3 That same year he joined
the majority in withholding standing from impoverished petitioners who sought enforcement of tax statutes to end the tax benefits
of health care centers which declined to furnish free medical
assistance." ° The Court's explanation was that the plaintiffs did
not show a causal link between their greater difficulty in obtaining
essential hospital services and the Internal Revenue Service allowance of tax advantages to a hospital supplying only emergency
aid. 10 5 Stewart contended that he could not "now imagine a case,
at least outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose
standing to litiown tax liability was not affected ever could have
10 6
gate the federal tax liability of someone else."'
Justice Stewart, however, was a part of a 1977 unanimous
Court that accorded standing to a Washington apple growers association that challenged the validity of a North Carolina law requiring all apples in closed containers entering or sold in the latter
state to feature their federal grade or the ungraded label. 0 7
Standing was present due to three elements allegedly missing in
the 1975 suit: the existence of standing if the association members
had sued individually; the relevance of the interests for which the
action was filed to the organization's purpose; and the absence of
a need for each association member to participate in the suit.'
In 1978, the Justice concurred in a Supreme Court decision to
grant standing to litigants who lived near the location of proposed
nuclear power plants.' 0 9 They challenged the constitutionality of
a federal statute limiting the liability of such plants for accidents
to $560,000,000.110 Although upholding the act, the Court found
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 504-06.
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
Id. at 44-46.
Id. at 46 (Stewart, J., concurring).
See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Coim'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1976).
Id. at 343.
See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
The challenged statute was the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
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that the plaintiffs had suffered injuries (specifically, higher water
temperatures in nearby lakes and low level radiation emissions)
sufficient to justify standing, and that, except for this law, the
plants would not have been built and the injuries would not have
occurred. Although sanctioning the statute, Justice Stewart opposed the accordance of standing since the petitioners lacked a
direct interest in the outcome of the case. He noted that an "interest in the local water temperature does not, in short, give these
appellees standing to bring a suit. . . to challenge the constitutionality of a law limiting liability in an unrelated and as-yet-tooccur major nuclear accident.""'
In 1979, Justice Stewart endorsed Justice Relnquist's dissent
from a majority ruling allowing standing to a village and its residents who accused local realtors of steering prospective
homebuyers into different communities in violation of federal fair
housing and civil rights laws."1 2 The Court found the claims that
the village was being deprived of racial balance and stability and
that the plaintiffs denied residents the social and professional advantages of an integrated community sufficient to warrant standing for the plaintiffs and residents, respectively. Stewart remained
plaintiffs had suffered direct injuries to jusunpersuaded that the
3
tify such a grant."
F.

ClassActions

Class actions' 14 may alleviate some of the expanding workload
of the federal judiciary. But since the number of suits instituted as
class actions has also been rising, 115 Stewart supported the tightening of rules governing class actions.
In 1969, Justice Stewart endorsed the Supreme Court's refusal
to permit the aggregation of individual claims into one that met
the $10,000 jurisdictional amount. 1 6 Four years later he joined a
majority in extending this limit to each claim within a class action.1 '7 In 1974, he supported a further constriction in a decision
which required plaintiffs in class action suits to notify all other
111. 438 U.S. at 95 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
112. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
113. See id. at 128-29 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
114. For a discussion of class actions within the federal court system, see C. WRIGHT,
supra note 80, § 72.
115. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 250, 253 (Table 31), 254 (Table 32).
116. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
117. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
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class members and to defray this cost. l B Because of the expense
and difficulty of locating other similarly situated persons, this decision erected a formidable barrier to the frequent use of the class
action, especially by indigent and politically weak claimants. The
impact of these decisions on the federal courts has been a pronounced one, especially since 1976 when 3,584 class actions were
filed."l 9 Since then, filings have dropped to 1,568 in 1980.120
G.

ResidualAreas

Justice Stewart tried to curb federal judicial access in two
other areas: public compensation for participation in govenmental proceedings and implied causes of action. The Justice supported the Court's decision to bar the plaintiffs' recovery of
attorney's fees in an environmental suit pertaining to construction
of the Alaska oil pipeline' 2 1'-a holding to which Congress responded in 1976.122 The basis for this ruling was the absence of
statutory authorization for the payment of such expenses.1 23 With
respect to implied causes of action, Stewart joined a unanimous
decision refusing to infer a civil cause of action that would have
enabled a stockholder to force corporate officials to repay unlawful federal campaign contributions. 124 The Court ruled that interceding law made the 25suit appropriate for Federal Election
Commission resolution.
IV.

JUSTICE STEWART AND JUDICIAL ACCELERATION

Justice Stewart's philosophy of federal judicial administration
encompassed more than merely the use of procedural devices to
restrict the access to federal courts. To him, the ability of federal
tribunals to keep pace with their caseloads and to render just and
expeditious decisions turned on discouraging some litigation and
accelerating the conversion of decisional inputs into holdings. His
outlook on accelerating federal judicial resolutions falls into three
118. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
119. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 250, 253 (Table 31).
120. Id.
121. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
122. PUB. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976), which gives federal courts discretion to
award attorneys' fees in civil rights cases, was enacted "to remedy anomolous gaps in our
See S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th
civil rights laws created by . . . Aileska Pipeline....
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5909.
123. See Aiyeska Ppeline, 421 U.S. at 269-71.
124. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
125. Id. at 74-77.
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areas: structural changes; managerial (or supervisory) actions;
and procedural alterations.
A. Structural Changes
When Potter Stewart was elevated to the Supreme Court in
1958, the structure of the federal court system was embedded in
tradition. It had not changed significantly since 1891 when Congress established courts of appeals to replace the circuit courts, in
which Supreme Court Justices and district judges traveled
throughout the circuit to hear cases. 126 During Justice Stewart's
years on the bench, however, notable structural changes occurred;
others received serious public debate.
One modification was the creation of the Federal Judicial
Center in 1967, an agency intended to serve as the research, development, and educational arm of the national court system. 127 In
1968, Congress provided a second structural alteration-a system
of salaried, legally qualified United States Magistrates which supplanted fee-paid, nonlawyer federal commissioners, and which
improved the assistance supplied to federal trial judges in coping
with their growing caseloads.12 8 Justice Stewart took public positions on neither of these developments, but in light of his definite
concern over growing caseloads, it is not unreasonable to assume
that he supported them. That asssumption would seem to hold
also regarding the creation of circuit executives' offices which
aided the circuit chief judges,1 2 9 and provision for an administrative assistant to the Chief Justice of the United States in 1972.130
Justice Stewart publicly stated his view on the most controversial proposed structural change for the national court system-the
establishment of a seven-member national court of appeals to be
jurisdictionally located between the Supreme Court and the
Courts of Appeals. Recommended in 1972 by a respected group
assembled by Chief Justice Burger, the proposed court was to be
staffed with Court of Appeals judges serving on a part-time basis
or, in a later version of this proposal, by separate jurists serving on
that court only.13 1 This would truncate most of the Supreme
126. See P. FISH, THE POLrrIcs OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 3-7 (1973); F.
KLEIN, FEDERAL & STATE COURT SYSTEMS 167-68 (1977).

127. Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219,

§

101, 81 Stat. 664.

128. Act of Oct. 17, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578,

§

101, 82 Stat. 1108-1114.

129. Act of Jan. 5, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-647, § 1, 84 Stat. 1907, 1908.
130. Act of Mar. 1, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-238,

§

1, 86 Stat. 46.

131. Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573,
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Court's docket by delegating most cases to the new tribunal,
which would return annually 400 to 500 (of the total 4,000 cases
heard annually) of the most significant disputes to the Supreme
32

Court. 1

Shortly after the announcement of this proposal, Justice
33
Stewart expressed his skepticism, due to the timing of this idea.1
As early as 1960, less than two years after coming to the high
court, he had publicly complained about the volume of his workload 134 but had not regarded it as sufficiently onerous to necessitate a drastic structural alteration. In 1973 he favored a national
court of appeals if the number of cases before the Supreme Court
continued to mount. 35 Two years later, however, he reiterated his
opposition to this proposal. 3 6 Even though the number of cases
reaching the high court still exceeds 4,000, there has been no sign
that he has (before or since his retirement) begun to support the
proposed national court of appeals, relying instead on the ap37
pointment of competent and diligent Justices.'
B. Supervision
Justice Stewart's opposition to the proposed national appellate
court did not affect his support of stronger supervision within the
current federal judicial framework. In 1966 and 1970, Stewart
was in seven-member majorities that augmented the managerial
authority of the federal circuit councils over the conduct of judges
within their regions. In two separate cases involving the same dispute, the Supreme Court declined to strike down an interlocutory
council order to prohibit a federal district judge from hearing
cases because of his allegedly flagrant behavior, which cases then
passed to other members of that circuit.138 Justice Stewart rejected
576-577, 611 (1973). See also I THE ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JusTIcE, Appellate Justice 1975: SUMMARY & BACKGROUND 24 (1975); "Mini-HighCourt' To Screen 4p.
peals Is Urged by Panel,Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1972, at 19, col. 2.
132. Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, supra note 131,
at 611. See also G. CASPER & R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT

93-118 (1976) (remedies for the workload problem discussed).
133. See No More a Court of Last Resort N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1973, § 4, at 6, col. 1.
134. See Stewart Dffers on Court Burden, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1960, at 41, col. 4.
135. See No More a Court f Last Resort?, supra note 133, at 6, col. 6.
136. See 4 JusticesSupport New Appeals Court, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1975, at 44, col. 4.
137. See W. BURGER, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 10 (Dec. 29, 1980), available from the Federal Judicial Center, Interview with Justice Potter Stewart, The Third
Branch, Jan. 1982, at 6.
138. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ChandlerI1]; Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 382 U.S.
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the dissent's argument 3 9 that the federal circuit council (before it
later revoked its order) had, in effect, removed a United States
trial judge from the bench and thus had preempted Congress' sole
authority to decide whether federal judges should be stripped of
their offices, and that such stringent managerial oversight might
threaten continued federal judicial autonomy. 4 '
In 1974, however, Justice Stewart tempered his inclination toward centralized judicial authority by voting to deny United
States District judges the authority to delegate habeas corpus evidentiary cases to their magistrates without legislative authorization. 4 1 This holding was premised on the lack of statutory
approval for such delegations. 4 2 In 1976, Congress rectified this
situation with the Federal Magistrate Act,'4 3 and in 1979 it extended the authority of such "parajudges" to all cases federal trial
judges could hear.'" This extension was subject to the approval
of the parties and the right45to appeal a magistrate's decision to a
supervising district judge. 1
Justice Stewart, however, would have allowed such jurists to
remand suits to the state courts because of overcrowded dockets. 146 Furthermore, he favored interlocutory appeals to the
Supreme Court in antitrust actions to preclude later direct appeals
from the final judgments of district courts. He believed the high
court's acceptance of the interlocutory appeals "would serve to
lighten the burden on trial courts and litigants alike."' 4 7
Stewart also was willing to send the review of decisions by
14 8
three-judge federal district panels back to the courts of appeal.
1003 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Chandler1]. For a thorough account of this controversy,
see J. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS 224-84 (1974).
139. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 136-37 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 141-43 (Black, J., dissenting); Chandler I, 382 U.S. at 1004-06 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
dis140. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 140-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 141-43 (Black, J.,
senting); Chandler I, 382 U.S. at 1006 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
141. See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974).
142. Id. at 469-73.
143. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, § 1, 90 Stat. 2729.
144. Act of Oct. 10, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 2(a)-(c), 93 Stat. 643 (codified at 28

U.S.C.A. § 636(a)-(c) (1982 Supp.).
145. Id. § 2(c)(1), (4) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c)(1), (4) (1982 Supp.).
146. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 360-61 (1976).
147. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 187 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
148. See Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 100-01 (1974).
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C. Procedure
A third area where Justice Stewart sought to accelerate federal
judicial business centers on procedural changes. Such changes
would involve such subjects as Supreme Court rulemaking authority, plea bargaining, courtroom order, the right to counsel,
unanimity in jury verdicts, and minimum jury size. He believed
that the Supreme Court possessed broad authority to establish litigation procedures for the entire federal judiciary-a position
shared by a majority of the Court, but not by Justices Black and
49
Douglas, who saw this matter as a congressional prerogative.'
Stewart supported the use of plea bargaining to resolve criminal cages without lengthy trials. This support, however, depended
on its intelligent and voluntary exercise with the advice of counsel. 15 1 In 1970, Stewart endorsed high court decisions protecting
these agreements from subsequent challenges on such grounds as
the possibility of receiving a death sentence in the event of trial
and conviction, 5 ' allegedly coerced confessions,152 and substan53
tial delay between confessions and the entrance of a guilty plea.
A year later he asserted that the defendant must be allowed to
withdraw from54 the agreement if the state violates its side of the
plea bargain.'
In 1970, Justice Stewart sanctioned the right of federal trial
judges to remove unruly defendants from courtrooms after warnings against disrupting their trials. 5 5 In 1971, he supported the
majority's extension of the right of counsel in misdemeanor trials
when convicted defendants faced possible incarceration.' 56 This
change may have lessened judicial caseflows by encouraging prosecutors to plea bargain minor criminal cases.
Although he supported six-member juries in state felony tri149. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts & Magistrates, 409 U.S. 1132-34
(1972); Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts,
383 U.S. 1087-93 (1966), 383 U.S. 1029-37 (1966), 374 U.S. 861-70 (1963), 368 U.S.
1009-14 (1961).
150. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241-43 (1969).
151. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970).
152. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
153. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
154. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 268 (1971) (Marshall, J., joined by
Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
156. See Agensinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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als,157 Justice Stewart-objected to the Supreme Court's approval of
felony convictions by less-than-unanimous margins. 158 He described the unanimity rule as "the simple and effective method
endorsed by centuries of experience and history to combat the injuries to the fair administration of justice that can be inflicted by
community passion and prejudice."' 59 In 1978, he joined the majority in overturning a misdemeanor conviction by a five-member
jury, which he believed prevented a fair trial. 16 0 He reasoned that
when a state criminal code was excessively broad and unconstitutional on its face, defendants convicted by five-person juries could
not be retried on the same charges. 16 1 Consequently, six-person
juries are necessary to balance judicial fairness and
speed in both
62
criminal and civil suits in federal district courts.'
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has examined Justice Stewart's philosophy toward federal judicial administraton as reflected in the decisions in
which he participated as a member of the Supreme Court. He
sought to improve the federal judicial system mainly by imposing
stringent restraints on the kinds of litigation permitted access to
the federal courts. Secondly, he supported structural, managerial,
and procedural efforts to accelerate the resolution of these cases.
Both methods were necessary, he felt, in order to improve the national judiciary's ability to settle disputes expeditiously and fairly.
Some of Justice Stewart's colleagues, most notably Chief
Justices Warren and Burger and Justices Clark, Brennan, and
Douglas, 163 have publicly commented on the necessity of improvement in federal judicial administration and the relative efficacy of various approaches. Chief Justice Warren, and Justices
Douglas and Brennan were generally reluctant to impede access to
157. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 143 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
158. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Apodaca
v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
159. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 399.
160. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
161. Id. at 246.
162. Burger, ChiefJstice's Yearend Report 1977, 64 A.B.A. J. 211, 214 (1978).
163. See, eg., Gazell, ChiefJustice Burger's Questfor JudicialAdministrativeEfficiency,
1977 DET. C.L. REv. 455 (1977); Gazell, Justice Douglas and JudicialAdministration:A
LibertarianApproach, 14 GONZ. L. REv.785 (1979); Gazell, Tom C Clark as JudicialReformer, 15 Hous. L. REv.307 (1978); Gazell, ChiefJustice Warren'sNeglectedAccomplishments in FederalJudicialAdministration,5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 437 (1978); Gazell, Justice
Brennan'sReections on JudicialModernization, 10 Rtrr.-CAM. L. RaV. (1978).
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the federal bench because they believed such limitations particularly hampered the ability of the poor and the powerless to protect
their rights. In contrast, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Clark
suggested that, unless the federal courts strictly regulate their
workloads, virtually all rights will be jeopardized.
Justice Stewart sympathized more with the latter view, which
is indicative of his position on federal judicial administration. For
instance, in 1974, he declared that "only a narrow construction is
consonant with the overriding policy, historically encouraged by
Congress, of minimizing the mandatory docket of this Court in
the interest of sound judicial administration." " Although he was
speaking of a specific statute and tribunal, his statement also reflected his general attitude toward the best way of managing the
federal courts.
Despite the end of Justice Stewart's involvement with federal
judicial administration at the Supreme Court level, his interest in
the field will continue. In a January, 1982 interview, 165 Justice
Stewart indicated that he will sit in the Courts of Appeals of the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits. His continued judicial service will
likely further his influence in the area of federal judicial
administration.

164. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 98 (1974).
165. Interview with Justice Potter Stewart, supra note 137, at 9.

